Pakistan appears to be winning an air battle only on social media, not in the skies. In recent weeks, Islamabad has aggressively promoted the narrative that its so-called indigenous fighter jet, the JF-17 Thunder, is witnessing unprecedented global demand. However, a closer examination suggests the claims are largely speculative and unsupported by concrete evidence.

At the centre of this narrative push is a series of reports by Reuters, authored by its Pakistan-based journalist Saad Sayeed. Since the start of 2026, multiple Reuters stories have suggested that countries such as Bangladesh, Sudan, Indonesia and even Saudi Arabia are considering or finalising deals to acquire the JF-17. Yet none of these reports provide signed contracts, delivery schedules or official confirmations.

One of the most controversial claims involved an alleged “jets-for-loans” arrangement with Saudi Arabia. The claim quickly unravelled after Pakistan’s own Foreign Office said it was unaware of any such discussions. Defence analysts also pointed out that Saudi Arabia already operates advanced aircraft like the F-15 and Eurofighter Typhoon and is moving toward acquiring F-35 stealth fighters, making interest in the JF-17 highly unlikely.

Similarly, a December 2025 Reuters report cited Pakistani military sources claiming a USD 4 billion JF-17 deal with Libya’s Khalifa Haftar, despite Libya being under a UN arms embargo — raising serious legal and credibility questions.

Critics argue that the JF-17 narrative is being used domestically to bolster Pakistan’s claims of success in Operation Sindoor and to project the country as an emerging defence manufacturing power. In reality, analysts note that Chinese-origin J-10C fighters, not JF-17s, were the primary aircraft involved in recent aerial engagements.

The gap between rhetoric and reality is also evident in export performance. The JF-17’s only confirmed foreign operators — Myanmar and Nigeria — have reportedly faced persistent issues, including substandard avionics, structural flaws and spare-parts shortages, leading to low operational availability.

Pakistan’s limited industrial capacity further undermines the export narrative. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex can reportedly produce only 20–25 aircraft a year and remains heavily dependent on Chinese avionics and Russian engines.

As scepticism grows, even Pakistani commentators and analysts have begun questioning the credibility of the claims. Observers warn that while inflated narratives may dominate headlines and online discourse, they cannot substitute for verified contracts, reliable performance and a robust defence manufacturing ecosystem.